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William B. Hickman, LTC, USA

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14. ABSTRACT

The thesis of this paper is the United States is winning in Iraq. Our political and military leadership have established clear objectives (tasks) that can be successfully accomplished and properly measured. To prove my thesis I will proceed down a four step process. First, define the US end state in Iraq – what is winning? In a press conference in March 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated the eight military objectives for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) focusing on regime change, WMD, terrorism, and intelligence collection. Second, there will be a review of basic insurgency patterns and phases (grievance, opening round and success) as defined by Julian Paget in his book, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare. During this step, I will apply Paget's generic insurgency description to the current Iraqi situation. The U.S. is currently in the opening round as Iraqi Security Forces are trained and a legitimate government is formed. Third, measuring our efforts in Iraq – includes developing and measuring critical criteria to determine if we are on the road to success in Iraq. Establishing legitimate governments, professional security forces, and targeting the population through civil projects are critical parts of the road to success. This road to success has to be navigated in a complex environment of religion, culture and global terrorism issues. Being able to properly measure your progress on this road is critical. Finally, given our criteria, what steps can we take to continue our operations in Iraq? In the end, transforming Iraq from a dangerous place threatened by a deadly insurgency into a free democratic nation with a new representative government and professional security forces.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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Winning the New Iraq – Counterinsurgency Operations

By

William B. Hickman
LTC, USA

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Army.

Signature: _____

(17 May 05)

CPT Sandy Neville
Faculty Advisor
Name, if applicable

Abstract

Winning the New Iraq – Counterinsurgency Operations

The thesis of this paper is the United States is winning in Iraq. Our political and military leadership have established clear objectives (tasks) that can be successfully accomplished and properly measured. To prove my thesis I will proceed down a four step process. First, define the US end state in Iraq – what is winning? In a press conference in March 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated the eight military objectives for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) focusing on regime change, WMD, terrorism, and intelligence collection. Second, there will be a review of basic insurgency patterns and phases (grievance, opening round and success) as defined by Julian Paget in his book, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare. During this step, I will apply Paget's generic insurgency description to the current Iraqi situation. The U.S. is currently in the opening round as Iraqi Security Forces are trained and a legitimate government is formed. Third, measuring our efforts in Iraq – includes developing and measuring critical criteria to determine if we are on the road to success in Iraq. Establishing legitimate governments, professional security forces, and targeting the population through civil projects are critical parts of the road to success. This road to success has to be navigated in a complex environment of religion, culture and global terrorism issues. Being able to properly measure your progress on this road is critical. Finally, given our criteria, what steps can we take to continue our operations in Iraq? In the end, transforming Iraq from a dangerous place threatened by a deadly insurgency into a free democratic nation with a new representative government and professional security forces.

Winning the New Iraq – Counterinsurgency Operations

The purpose of this paper is to examine the question – is the U.S. winning the war in Iraq? This simple question first begs the answer to three additional questions. First, what is the end state or stated another way what does winning look like? Second, what is the given environment (cultural, political, social, and religious) in which we have to fight this insurgency, and how can we shape the nature of war within this environment so that we can win? Third, how do we know we are winning; what are the critical metrics that allow an objective analysis on how well we are doing in Iraq?

To answer the questions above and the thesis of this paper - the United States is winning in Iraq. Our political and military leadership have established clear objectives (tasks) that can be successfully accomplished and properly measured. To prove my thesis I will proceed down a four step process. First, define the U.S. end state in Iraq – what is winning? In a press conference in March 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated the eight military objectives for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The goals focused on regime change, WMD, terrorism, and intelligence collection.[1] This paper will reflect a short review of the goals and our efforts to accomplish them. Second, there will be a review of basic insurgency patterns and phases as defined by Julian Paget in his book, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare. Paget's generic phases are (1) Grievance of the Population, (2) Opening Round of a Fight, and (3) Success against the Insurgents.[2] During this step, Paget's generic insurgency description will be applied to the current Iraqi situation. Third, measuring our efforts in Iraq –

[1] Donald H. Rumsfeld,"DoD News Briefing," 21 March 2003.1.
[2] Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 30-37.

includes developing and measuring critical criteria to determine if we are on the road to success in Iraq. Establishing legitimate governments, professional security forces, and targeting the population are critical parts of the road to success. This road to success has to be navigated in a complex environment of religious, cultural and global terrorism issues. Being able to properly measure your progress on this road is critical. As I explain the metrics, there will be a review of the concept of execution, because in the end, you can have a great plan but the execution phase is when an organization succeeds or fails. Finally, the discussion of the way ahead – given our criteria, what steps should we take to continue our operations in Iraq? In the end, transform Iraq from a dangerous place threatened by a deadly insurgency into a free democratic nation.

Before starting with the four-step process, there are three key areas that are critical to understanding the Iraqi people and how to establish a new Iraq (defeat the insurgency) – Islam, culture and global terrorism.

Islam. Bernard Lewis in his book, Islam and the West, states, "Islam is still the most effective form of consensus in Muslim countries, the basic group identity of the masses. As regimes come closer to the populace, even if their verbiage is leftist, and ideological, they will become more Islamic."[3] As Americans working with our Iraqi partners, we must learn as much as possible about Islam and understand that Islamic teachings are going to have a significant impact on the future new Iraq constitution. The more we understand Islamic faith the more we can work with the Iraqis in applying the fundamental basic rights of all people (representative government, equal opportunity, basic freedoms) to a new constitution. Tackling these difficult issues early will prevent bigger problems in the long term. Michael Schuler in his book, Imperial Hubris, provides

[3] Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 154.

a revealing statement in comparing Christianity and Islam when he quotes Patrick J. Ryan, "The Kingdom of Christ is not in this world," while "[c] reating is the concrete an ideal state lies at the heart of Islam…Islam must work out, must succeed [on earth], in social and economic terms, or else its divine origins would appear in doubt."[4] Islam has a fundamentally different approach to religion and its purpose on earth than Christianity.

Culture. American political and military leaders serving in Iraq and setting policy and objectives in the United States must understand the Iraqi culture. We have to understand the strengths of the Iraqi culture and with our Iraqi partners leverage these strengths to build a new Iraq. Harrison and Huntington in their book, Culture Matters, state, "Culture is a significant determinant of a nation's ability to prosper because culture shapes individual's thoughts about risks, reward and opportunity."[5] Our Iraqi end state, our strategy to reach that end state and how we measure success must have a strong influence from Iraqi culture. If we don't understand and take into account the Iraqi culture, we will consistently go in different directions from our Iraqi partners. Harrison and Huntington go on to state, "Our strategy for change and creating prosperity in nations should meet the tests of an actionable strategy."

-Balance the past with the future
-Be explicit and shared
-Be informed with analysis
-Be based on an integrated set of choices
-Help the people become who they want to be[6]

[4] Patrick J. Ryan, quoted in Michael Schuler, Imperial Hubris (Washington D.C.: Brassey's, Inc, 2004), 205.
[5] Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington. Culture Matters (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 282.
[6] Ibid. p.282.

Global Terrorism. As we fight the Iraqi insurgency, we must never lose sight of the larger war on terrorism. We have had some significant successes. Giles Kepel in his book, The War for Muslim Minds, states,

> The principal goal of terrorism – to seize power in Muslim countries through mobilization of populations galvanized by jihad's sheer audacity – has not been realized. Taliban controlled Afghanistan, the only state governed according to the sharia has been liquidated. In Sudan, General Bashir has placed Hassan al-Turabi under house arrest. In Libya, Col Muammar Qaddafi has recanted and admitted responsibility for the attack.[7]

Al Qaeda has suffered serious losses. The U.S. must continually understand the second and third order effect of those losses. Iraq and specifically the Fallujah battle is a good example of the second and third order effects. The military won the battle for Fallujah. Many terrorists and insurgents were killed or captured, but a significant number escaped and inflicted significant attacks across other parts of Iraq. In the broad war on terror, the U.S. needs a strategy to attack and kill or capture the terrorists that escape before they can reconstitute in different countries. We must keep the pressure on the terrorists.

ENDSTATE

The first step in measuring our success is to identify the end state – what does winning look like? Much has been written about US goals for Iraq – classified and unclassified. In a New York Times article, Michael Gordon references a "top secret document titled, 'Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy'."[8] From his sources, Gordon lists three specific US goals:

-Topple a dictator
-Build a democratic system

[7] Giles Kepel. The War For Muslim Minds Islam and the West (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 145.
[8] Michael Gordon. "The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War," (New York Times, 19 Oct 2004), 2.

-Preserve, but reform, the bureaucracies that did the day to day work of running the country[9]

Unstated goals included, "installing a pro-American government would put pressure on Syria to stop supporting terrorists groups and Iran to halt its nuclear program."[10] Shortly after the war started (March 03) Secretary of Defense Rumsfield was quoted as stating the eight military objectives for Iraqi Freedom:

-End the regime of Saddam Hussein
-Identify, isolate and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
-Search for, capture, and drive out terrorists from that country
-Collect and search for intelligence as we can related to terrorists networks
-Collect such intelligence as we can related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction
-End sanctions and immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and too many needy Iraqi citizens
-Secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people
-Help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government[11]

These national and military goals are nested to provide guidance to military commanders; they remain unchanged. The U.S. is pursuing a strategy to support the establishment of an Iraqi representative government that, through stability based on a democratic system, will have positive second and third order effects across the region. The diagram below provides a summary of the strategic end state and the broad issues that affect the timely accomplishment of the end state.

[9] Ibid. p.2.
[10] Ibid. p.2.
[11] Rumsfeld, 1.



Goal 1: Topple Saddam's government – quickly accomplished – some might argue almost too fast which led to chaos in the major cities

Goal 2: Result of OIF was the Iraqi military melted into the population, bureaucratic managers failed to come to work, and security forces failed to execute their jobs – result was wide spread looting which crippled a national infrastructure already in a shambles and bureaucratic systems (local governments, police, water and electric companies) ceased to exist or were terribly ineffective.

Goal 3: Building an Iraqi political system was poorly planned by the US Administration – no national level organization was organized to meet this daunting challenge

The result of the initial military OIF actions (phases 1-3) was goal 1 successfully completed and goals 2 and 3 poorly planned and executed. The result was the conditions were set for an insurgency. Today, the stated goals remain unchanged; the question remains, is the U.S. succeeding in our current status to accomplish those goals.

INSURGENCY PHASES

The second step in determining whether the Iraqi government and security forces fighting alongside US forces are winning the counterinsurgency fight is an understanding of insurgency. Paget in his book, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare, describes three generic phases to an insurgency. Below are listed Paget's phases with a description and then applied the phases to the current Iraqi insurgency.

Paget describes phase 1 as "usually starting with some element of the populace concerned having a grievance, real or contrived or imagined. This develops into a clash of interests between them and the Government, in which the insurgents decide sooner or later that the time has come to achieve their aims by violence rather than by peaceful means."[12] Clearly, at the end of major combat operations (May 03), major segments of the Iraqi population ranged from discontented to openly hostile to the United States and coalition forces in Iraq. These groups of people, primarily Sunni Arabs, included the dissolved Iraqi military, the dismissed senior Ba'ath party members, and the general Sunni Arab population that went from a position of national dominance to a minority. Unless the US leadership reacted quickly, the seeds were set for a significant insurgency led and financed by educated leadership primarily from within Iraq but with some outside foreign support. The basic requirements for an insurgency to start as outlined by Paget – "a cause to fight for, support from the local populace, bases, mobility, and supplies"[13] were all in place by June 03. Ahmed S. Hashem in his article, "Iraq's Chaos" states,

> the insurgency began in May 2003 with an outbreak of violence among the Sunni Arab population in an area bounded by the cities of Baghdad, Ramadi, and Fallujah that has come to be know as the 'Sunni Triangle'. The grievances of that minority group privileged under Saddam Hussein's regime – stem from the threat to their identity in the new post-Sunni Iraq, the mistaken assumption that they would accept their loss of status and privileges peacefully, and certain 'muscular' aspects of the American response to their discontent.[14]

Paget describes phase 2 as the "initiation of military action against the insurgent organization concerned. But it is essentially a defensive phase, in which the insurgents

[12] Padget, 31.
[13] Ibid. 23.
[14] Ahmed S. Hashim,"Iraq's Chaos," Boston Review, 11 March 2005, 3.

hold the initiative, while the civil, military, and police forces are hurriedly built up."[15] When this phase began in Iraq is not the critical factor. What is important is that Iraq was a country without a legitimate government and no effective security forces in the summer of 2003. The coalition forces started phase two – opening round of the fight – without an effective Iraqi political and military partner. Examples of the signs that this phase was ongoing was when the operation that resulted in the death of Saddam's two sons (Uday and Quasy) also netted a large sum of money - strong evidence that former regime loyalists (Ba'ath party members and former military) were planning and executing the insurgency. Second, a strong foreign leadership and fighters presence especially visible in Fallujah – a city where US forces did not operate and created a safe haven for the insurgents. Third, during this opening round of the defensive phase, the US military suffered critical set backs with Iraqi security forces to include ineffective Iraqi military performance in Fallujah (April 04), spotty performance in Najaf (Spring 04) and the disintegration of the Mosul police force in November 04.

The question remains whether the U.S. is reaching the end of phase 2. The answer appears to be yes. Paget states, "It is not easy to assess the moment at which Phase Two moves to Phase Three. But there comes a stage where the Security Forces can feel that they are beginning to gain the upper hand against the insurgents."[16] Clearly, there is a long way to go but the Iraqi Security Forces have had several significant successes against the insurgents – the Iraqis have gone on the offensive. These Iraqi successes include successful participation in the battle for Fallujah (Nov 04), providing the critical security for the Iraqi election (Jan 05), and security control of selected

[15] Paget, p.30.
[16] Ibid. p.37.

sections of Baghdad and Mosul. As Paget points out winning "the military campaign does not mean the solution to the problem."[17] Iraqi Security forces must set the conditions for a successful political solution.

Paget describes Phase 3 as the "task of the security forces is completed and the ultimate solution of the problem is left in the hands of the political leaders."[18] In the end the Iraqi Security Forces must provide a reasonable level of security so that a legitimate Iraqi government can be formed that can, through inclusion of the major population segments (Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd), eliminate the initial Sunni grievance that led to the insurgency. "Political factors come more and more into prominence at this stage, and military action is increasingly adjusted accordingly."[19]

Today in Iraq the Coalition and the Iraqi government are in the gray area between Phase 2 and 3. Each day the Iraqi Security forces are improving and taking offensive action against the insurgents but the insurgents are still a threat to the new government. The new government must demonstrate it will fairly represent all segments of the population – this factor cannot be completely demonstrated until a fair constitution is approved and a new national election is completed.

CRITICAL CRITERIA AND METRICS

The third step in answering the question – are the U.S and coalition forces winning in Iraq – is to develop and apply critical criteria – measure the current situation to determine whether if the U.S forces are going in the right direction. This step is divided into four parts. Part one is an examination of reoccurring counterinsurgency lessons learned. Part two is applying these lessons learned to Iraq using a doctrinal

[17] Ibid. p.37.
[18] Ibid. p.37.
[19] Ibid. p.38.

approach. Part three is a review of the Iraq diversity – Shi'a, Kurds and Sunni. Part four is then the transforming of the information into a "Winning the New Iraq" construct based on a measurable actionable strategy.

Lessons Learned

After studying historical cases of counter insurgency and counter guerrilla operations, several recurring lessons are worth noting here.

-*Focus on the population* - Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannon in their book, Counter Guerrilla Operations The Philippine Experience, state one "approach to counter guerrilla operations, one that might be called 'stealing their thunder'. As the name implies, the idea is to beat the guerrilla at his own game, to try to attract more support from the civilians in the areas of operations than can the guerrilla, while at the same time winning combat superiority."[20]

-*Moral high ground* - Valeriano and Bohannon also state, "forces on the ground demonstrate their own moral superiority; they must find ways to dramatize their concern for the people."[21]

-*Security and support* – The US Army Counterinsurgency Planning Guide states, "Counterinsurgency operations seek to create an environment of security and popular trust which will permit orderly progress toward achieving national and popular goals."[22]

-*Political, psychological and economic actions* – The Planning Guide also states, "the effort must aim at denying the insurgent his bases of popular support by a combination of political, psychological, and economic actions while at the same time concentrating offensive counter guerrilla efforts toward neutralization of the guerrilla threat."[23]

-*Effective legitimate government* – Blanfarb and Tanham in their book, Who Will Win? provide several lessons learned on the actions of the government. First, "all military operations will be wasted if success cannot be exploited by an effective civil government."[24] Second, "military civil actions help but cannot solve the problem. It is the civil government which will have to maintain them but does it have the complete staff to do this."[25] Third, "the people are the target – meaning that the purpose of the activity, or much of it, was to affect popular attitudes and not simply to kill the enemy."[26]

[20] Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannon, Counter Guerrilla Operations The Philippine Experience (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 27.
[21] Ibid. p.27.
[22] US Army Special Warfare School, Counterinsurgency Planning Guide (Ft Bragg, NC, 1964), 21.
[23] Ibid. p.21.
[24] Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, Who Will Win? (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1989), VI.
[25] Ibid. p.IV.
[26] Ibid. p.19.

Doctrinal Approach

Below are listed the generic lessons learned and applied to Iraq using a doctrinal approach – decisive, shaping, and sustaining forces

-Decisive Force – the legitimate Iraqi Government that fairly represents the entire population and adequately addresses the minority grievances so that the insurgency is defeated.

-Shaping Force – the security forces (police and army) set the conditions so that the legitimate governments (local, regional and national) can operate effectively. The ultimate goal is a police force capable of maintaining internal security.

-Sustaining Force – the sustaining force maintains the momentum. The government demonstrates over an extended period that it is legitimate and can provide for the people and is best for the nation. This force has a major part in maintaining government control over areas where the insurgents have been defeated.

Iraq Diversity

Before transforming the lessons learned and key tasks into metrics, it is important to understand the critical Iraqi conditions. Iraq is a complex nation and society. In Iraq there are three primary groups that directly effect the accomplishment of the national goals. Shams C. Inati in his book, Iraq Its History, People, and Politics, use the term, "Unity in Diversity."[27] Through the centuries, Iraq has always been a diverse region – Jews, Christians, Muslims (Sunni and Shi'a) and Kurds all have flourished and coexisted at different times. Today, unity through diversity (Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd) could be used to describe the goals of the current Iraqi government. First, the majority group and main

[27] Shams C. Inati, ed., Iraq Its History, People, and Politics (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2003), 129.

power in the current Iraqi government is the Shi'a. In the pre Saddam and Sunni dominated era, there is strong evidence of a Shi'a political representative ideology. Joyce Wiley writes, "Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the other prominent clerics in Najaf came to believe [1950s] that Muslims could obtain legitimate government only by establishing it themselves … al-Sadr envisioned Iraqis governing themselves by means of an elected legislature and an elected executive … outlined a judicial branch to function somewhat as the U.S Supreme Court does – except that where as the U.S. Supreme Court reviews laws for their adherence to the U.S. Constitution, the proposed Iraqi Court would review proposed laws to make sure they did not violate Islam."[28] Wiley goes on to state that, "al-Sadr interpreted the shura to require the people's participation in their own governance, a logical application of the Qur'anic injunctions, given the increased educational level of the Muslim public and people's expectations of self-government in the modern world."[29] There is a history of the Shi'a supporting a democratic style government.

The Kurds are the second group – non-Arab but Sunni Muslims that live in the Northern three provinces of Iraq. Ghareeb in describing the Kurds situation (pre-OIF) stated, "the Kurds appear to be living on borrowed time and are dependent on the United States for protection. Ultimately, they have to resolve their conflict with Baghdad."[30] From the current situation and recent Iraqi election, the Kurds seemed to understand this point – the economic, political, and social benefits are greater if they become deeply involved in shaping a new Iraq.

[28] Ibid. p.157.
[29] Ibid. p.157.
[30] Ibid. p.181.

The third group is the Sunni Arabs, the former dominant group who controlled the country by controlling the military, political appointments, and the nation's wealth. Clearly, this group provides the insurgents the large majority of their manpower, funding, logistical support and safe havens. The Iraqi political leaders and security forces must continue to target the Sunni Arabs with the goal of convincing them to become stakeholders in a new Iraq. The Sunnis must be convinced through words and actions that their lives will actually be better than when they held absolute power.

Metrics

After identifying the end state (what winning looks like), reviewing the basic counterinsurgency phases and lessons learned, identifying the key tasks and the forces to accomplish those tasks, now it is time to develop metrics. How can we tell that the massive efforts in military personnel and national funding are successful? If not, what actions are needed to get back on track? The diagram below provides my construct of how to win the new Iraq (defeat the insurgency).



The government, security forces and institutions must answer to the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people are clearly the center of gravity (COG) for both the insurgents and the new Iraqi government. With the current adequate level of cooperation between the Kurds and Shi'a, the center of gravity focus must remain on the Sunnis to cease the insurgency through carrots (positions in the new Iraqi government, economic support , and security force membership) and sticks (coordinated Iraqi/US operations to defeat the insurgents). Operations should be designed to demonstrate that the insurgents cannot win against the Iraqi/US coalition.

Due to religious and cultural differences, the US military and civilian leadership will never be able to appeal directly to the Iraqi people. The differences between Americans and Iraqis are too great, plus the stigma of the US military being perceived as

an occupying power cannot be overcome. To get to the Iraqi people, the US must assist in building organizations, institutions, and processes that are run by Iraqi leadership. By measuring how effectively these new organizations, institutions, and processes work, we can measure our effectiveness of winning the Iraqi people over to the new Iraqi government position and away from the insurgents.

Attached are examples of metrics that support the measurement of the stated tasks. The U.S. is on the right road, but a lot of hard work must still be accomplished. Most of this work must be completed by the Iraqis themselves.

WAY AHEAD

The building blocks for success are slowly but effectively being put in place to defeat the insurgency and develop a new democratic Iraq. The military focus – fighting the insurgency, training the Iraqi security forces, and supporting the political process and civic actions, must now constantly focus on execution. Bossidy and Charan state, "No company can deliver on its commitments or adapt well to changes unless all leaders practice the discipline of execution at all levels."[31] In fighting an insurgency, where sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and lieutenant colonels through their daily actions can push the successful momentum forward or cause regional setbacks that last for weeks or months, proper execution at all levels is critical.

One way to visualize this fight, especially for our tactical leaders, is to think about battlefield complexity. At the tactical level on a symmetric battlefield, a professional force disrupts the enemy's strategy (plan) by making the enemy make a mistake, by making the situation as complex as possible, by attacking with multiple forms of contact

[31] Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan. Execution The Discipline of Getting Things Done (New York: Crown Business, 2002), 19.

simultaneously – direct, indirect, NBC, obscuration (smoke), mines, observation, and psychological. You attack his plan by dictating the nature of the fight. In the same fashion at the operational level in an insurgency, a government and coalition can disrupt an insurgent/terrorist's strategy. The government can make the situation as complex as possible by attacking with multiple forms of power – consolidating support of the people, and security operations, discrediting the insurgent/terrorists and separating their operations from the people; and finally, attacking the terrorists/insurgent force while at the same time protecting the people.

Provided below is a synchronization matrix for Winning the New Iraq. We must remain focused on efficient use of our resources along these functional lines. The end result is an effective democratic Iraqi government that answers to all the Iraqi people.



In closing, I want to end on a quote from Natan Sharansky's book, The Case for Democracy. Sharnasky states, "Moral clarity provides us with a place to stand, a reference point from where to leverage our talents, ideas, and energies to

create a better world."[32] He goes on to state a "fear society is no match for a free society that can unleash the creative potential of its own people."[33] This is the key to Iraq - unleashing freedoms to the Iraqi people. Once experienced they will never want to go back to an authoritative repressive regime.

[32] Nathan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, The Case For Democracy The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), XVIII.
[33] Ibid, p. 135.

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Legitimate Iraqi Government – Accountable to the People

Decisive Force

TASKS	SUB TASKS	METRICS
1. Establish an effective civil government that executes	**a. Constitutional / representative government / appeals to national traditions**	**-ratified constitution** **-citizens participate in elections** **-real choice for each election** **-celebrate national holidays (armed forces day, …)** **-people free to openly express views without retribution** **-organized opposition participates in the governmental process**
	Executive body **National – president** **Regional – governor** **City/district – mayor**	**-elected by the citizens** **-International recognition as national leader** **-accountable to the people (fair elections scheduled)** **-routine interaction w/civilian groups** **-routine press conferences (by executive and senior appointees)** **-routine visits to security forces**
	Legislative body **National – parliament** **Regional – council** **City/district – council**	**-elected by the citizens** **-accountable to the people (scheduled fair elections)** **-routine interaction w/civilian groups** **-regional representation of groups**
	Judiciary **National – courts** **Regional – courts** **City/District – courts**	**-operational on predictable schedule** **-qualified judges (international standard)** **-system based on constitutional rights**

actual measurement must be by region and conducted by in country experts

Legitimate Iraqi Government – accountable to the people

Decisive Force

(CONT)

TASKS	SUB TASKS	METRICS
1. Establish an effective civil government that executes	**b. Technical Departments -provide government services (water, power, fuel, mail, sewage, trash collection, roads, public transportation)**	**-reliable electricity (predictable coverage)** **-adequate propane supply** **-sewage controlled** **-clean water supply** **-predictable RR schedule** **-landfills operational** **-accurate, fair, responsible billing system for services** **-religious oversight – interfaith cooperation** **-adequate medical facilities** **-adequate school facilities**

actual measurement must be by region and conducted by in country experts

Security Forces – professional, full coalition partner

Shaping Force

TASKS	SUB TASKS	METRICS
2. Establish effective Iraqi security forces	**a. Germaine to all security forces**	**-appreciated by the local pop.** ——— **-co-located w/in the cities/ neighborhoods** ——— **-respect for individual lives and property** ——— **-integrated intel system between types of security forces** ——— **-integrated operational system** ——— **-respect for local customs/religions** ———
	b. Police	**-proper equipment** ——— **-proper training** ——— **-expert in assigned area** ———
	c. Army	**-professional military** ——— **-proper equipment** ——— **-proper training** ——— **-expert in assigned area** ——— **-represents the national population** ———

actual measurement must be by region and conducted by in country experts

Economic Forces – growth, opportunity, long term positive outlook

Sustaining Force

TASKS	SUB TASKS	METRICS
3. Maintain the momentum by providing long term stability and opportunity to the nation's citizens	**a. Private business, industry, and entrepreneurs**	**-provide nongovernmental services** ***banking** ***transportation** ***markets** ***travel opportunities**
	b. Religious organizations	**-freedom of religion** **-independent religious councils**
	c. Economic system -stable, sustained growth	**-low inflation** **-national stock market** **-foreign investment** **-government tax incentives** **-government support trade** **-students studying abroad** **-foreign economic ldr visits** **-middle class sustaining growth**

actual measurement must be by region and conducted by in country experts